














Thesis Advisors: J. W. Creighton
S. Laner










2. OOVT ACCESSION MO. 1. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMB EN
4. TITLE (and Subtttta)
Using Organizational Mechanisms to
Encourage Innovation
9- TYRE OF REPORT a RERIOO COVERED
Master's Thesis
September 1979
• . PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHORS
Thomas Francis Sullivan
»• CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBERS
t. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PP.OJECT, TASK
AREA a WORK UNIT NUMBERS





IS. NUMBER OF PAGES
35
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME a AOORESS/// dittarant from Controlling Ottiea)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940
IS. SECURITY CLASS, tot thlm riport)
Unclassified
(•a. OECLASSIFI CATION/ DOWN GRADING
SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT Co/ ihlm Kapart)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (oi Ma aaattact antarad In Mloek 30. It dittarant frost Kaport)
It. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES














20. ABSTRACT (Contlnua on ravaraa tlda It nacaaaary and idanttty ay alaak i taae)
The concept that innovation can help improve organizational
effectiveness is advanced. An examination of the organizational
environment suggests innovation is under-utilized within the
corporate structure. The rationale for its not being used more
extensively is modeled and discussed. It is proposed that an






EDITION OF 1 NOV • • IS OBSOLETE
S/N 102-014- SfiO 1 I UNCLASSIFIED





initiate the changes needed to exploit innovation. Finally,
how the mechanism effects the chief executive and the organi




S/N 0102-014-6601 2 sgeuoiw classification o? this p*acr**«< o«»« *«»•»•*>







B.S., San Diego State University, 1969
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of






The concept that innovation can help improve organiza-
tional effectiveness is advanced. An examination of the organi-
zational environment suggests innovation is under-utilized with-
in the corporate structure. The rationale for its not being
used more extensively is modeled and discussed. It is pro-
posed that an organizational mechanism can be designed, built,
and used to initiate the changes needed to exploit innovation.
Finally, how the mechanism effects the chief executive and the
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I. INTRODUCTION
Today's manager operates in an environment fraught with
problems of decreasing resources, declining numbers of per-
sonnel and reduced budgets. He or she is expected to over-
come these obstacles through resourceful improvements in
efficiency or effectiveness. One alternative which can
achieve these goals is innovation.
What is innovation? Innovation is not a technological
advancement. Innovation is the process of applying a given
technology to areas other than those for which it was origi-
nally designed. It requires imagination, the ability to
organize, and the skills necessary to overcome skeptics and
detractors. Stockfish [Ref. 13] describes the following five
general characteristics of the innovation process:
1. An innovation is often made possible by some tech-
nological improvement; not necessarily directed
towards its eventual application.
2. An innovation often requires organizational changes.
3. Innovations can often entail a change in the status
quo among specialized subgroups within the larger
organization.
4. Innovations are most likely to occur after an organi-
zation has experienced some external force or shock.
5. Although most innovations have a technological founda-
tion, some occur as a result of changes in the social
environment.
It is obvious from the above description that timing,
personalities, and organizational environment play extremely
important roles in the innovative process. Upper management's
8

influence in these areas is critical to the establishment of
an atmostphere which encourages the use of innovation. With-
out management support this resource becomes neglected and
opportunities for organizational and functional improvements
are lost.
Unfortunately innovation falls in the category of many
similar activities. The concepts and philosophy behind utilizing
innovation are beyond reproach. Discussions on the topic will
normally result in positive responses from chief executives.
They fully agree with the rational for its use and verbally
support its implementation. Active pursuit of the objective,
however, rarely occurs. Innovation becomes relegated to the list
of needs titled "Nice to Have" and is thereby excluded from the
mandatory requirements group. Innovation must compete with
more pressing activities and, therefore, becomes one more bur-
den for management. Since the urgency for innovation is not
defined and management incentives do not exist, it can be per-
petually delayed.
The process is not peculiar to innovation. It affects
many other activities which are also vying for executive at-
tention. Its frequency is a function of the number of indivi-
duals marketing their specific interests at a given point in
time
.
Understanding this process can be helpful. If a special
activity, i.e. innovation, can provide benefits to the organi-
zation, then it behooves the chief executive not only to be
aware of the process, but to interrupt the natural cycle.

The executive's efforts should be directed toward converting
innovation into a viable corporate objective and thereby caus-
ing it to effectively compete with existing urgent needs.
The purpose of this study is to examine this process and
determine how innovation can be exploited by setting up appro-
priate organizational mechanisms. The assumption is made that
once an activity is institutionalized it no longer has to com-
pete for attention. It becomes increasingly self -perpetuating
,
especially if the promised benefits materialize.
10

II. INNOVATION IN THE ORGANIZATIONAL CONTEXT
A. ORGANIZATIONAL INCENTIVES
Inherent in any organization are incentives which affect
an individual's attitude toward innovation. These incentives
can be categorized as either negative or positive. Positive
incentives are those which encourage the use of innovation.
They might include increased visibility, improved professional
standing, promotions and advancement. Successful innovators
normally expect to receive one or more of these rewards for
their efforts.
In direct contrast are the negative incentives. They can
include non-recognition, fear of failure, loss of promotion,
or even separation if the innovation is unsuccessful. Nega-
tive incentives usually outweigh positive ones. In addition,
the most drastic negative incentive, separation, is far more
dramatic than any of the positive incentives. Therefore, most
organizations experience a much stronger influence by the
negative factors with consequent minimal innovative activity.
B. MANAGEMENT INCENTIVES
In order to counteract the negative factors, management
must become actively involved. Through careful evaluation
and persistent suppression of the negative incentives an en-
vironment conducive to innovative activities can be developed.
This approach seems rather simple and straightforward. It is,
therefore, important to examine the realities of the situation,
11

Like the innovators themselves, management is faced
with the dilemma of not having strong motivational factors
which would cause them to pursue innovation. Their view is one
of seeing innovation as an additional burden. While it is
agreed that innovation is needed, the actions necessary to
achieve the end product require the diversion of time and re-
sources from current needs. Resources and time are always
limited. The executive is normally constrained to addressing
immediate and urgent concerns; consequently innovation will be
put off to a "more opportune time." In reality "a more oppor-
tune time" never occurs. Innovation becomes a luxury that can
be had only if the resources and time ever become available.
This syndrome occurs at all levels of management. It is
perhaps most serious when exhibited by the chief executive.
His or her time is most valuable and usually in the shortest
supply. There is a continuum of individuals and groups trying
to obtain chief executive support for their particular interests.
If their requests are logical and have merit they are usually
accorded an opportunity to plead their case. Seldom do their
requests generate any action responses. At best, they receive
verbal support and assurance that future decisions will in-
clude careful consideration of their recommendations.
C. CHIEF EXECUTIVE ACTION MODEL
Ideally, the chief executive utilizes all available re-
sources, including innovation, to attain corporate objectives.
He insures that the organizational environment is receptive to




Unfortunately the ideal rarely occurs. The process breaks
down and innovation becomes a lost resource. A schematic re-
presentation of innovation being rejected from the chief execu-
tive's work sphere is shown in Fig. 1. The inner circle
represents the chief executive. The area surrounding the in-
ner circle, the pentration barrier, is a shell which buffers out
elements which are not considered urgent or mandatory. The incom-
ing arrows are requests for chief executive action and/or atten-
tion. They originate from various corporate activities, needs,
and special interests. If they are successful in crossing the
penetration barrier they elicit executive response which result
in positive actions. If they fail to pierce the barricade,
a non-action response occurs. The response may be positive and
supportive in nature but is totally verbal in content No or-
ganizational changes are generated nor is the topic seriously
discussed until the next penetration effort occurs.
The pentration barrier performs a function comparable to
that of a diode in an electronic circuit. It effectively blocks
all incoming current from the anode unless the electrical po-
tential is sufficient to break through the barrier. In the
model, a breakthrough will happen only when the intruder has
enough energy in the form of political clout or disruptive in-
fluence to adversely impact the organization if action is not
forthcoming.
The amount of energy needed to cross the barrier is direct-
ly proportional to the size of the organization. Large com-
panies tend to generate a large field of forces due to their






















Figure 1: Chief Executive Action Model
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the local economy. Many of these forces have inherent priority
of entry and must be admitted. These actions reduce the amount
of time available for intruder activities. Lower level intru-
ders have a more difficult time making contact, let alone pene-
trating the barrier.
For the same reasons the shell thickness is indirectly pro-
portional to the quantity of current intruders. As the number
goes up, the screening process completely eliminates elements
with lesser priorities. The less important intruders must
evolve to a state of higher energy before they can hope to
establish initial communication.
D. ANALYSIS OF INTRUDERS
Successful intruders, those able to penetrate the barrier,
have several common traits. They normally have a direct im-
pact on the corporate product or directly effect the executive's
performance. Generally, ignoring the highpriority intruder
will result in an unwanted event which will adversely affect
production or the executive's career. It is, therefore, easier
to respond at the time of intrusion than to suffer the conse-
quences of non-action. The successful intruder usually has
direct access to the chief executive and is able to attract
executive attention when needed.
Unsuccessful intruders also have common characteristics.
They lack major representation within the organization and
do not have the ability to disrupt the production process.
It is, therefore, easier to disregard their requests and satis-
fy their interests with verbal acknowledgements. They can be
15

effectively buffered by sending them to lower level managers
when it is inconvenient for the chief executive to meet with
them. Their requests are usually logical, worthy of considera-
tion, and have the potential for corporate benefits if imple-
mented. They are normally thought of as luxuries because the






Society looks upon the chief executive as the center of
power in any organization. Theoretically the corporation is
a reflection of his personality and particular management
style. His desires and preferences are carefully monitored
and provide the stimulus for management policies throughout the
hierarchy.
Galbraith, in his discussion of "The Technostructure,
"
[Ref. 4] presents a different picture. He theorizes that
corporate and societal power is held by groups within organi-
zations and not by individuals. Executive policy is really a
reflection of decisions made by groups located throughout the
organizational structure. The groups are formal and informal
and their membership is based on current informational needs
for a specific decision.
A similar position is held by Laner. [Ref. 6] He maintains
that major changes in corporate policies are often a result of
pressures applied from the bottom of the organization. These
changes appear to have originated at the top. In actuality
they occurred because a special interest group was able to ap-
ply sufficient pressure on the chief executive to change com-
pany goals. In terms of the Chief Executive Action Model they
could be labeled as "Successful Intruders" and the change
would be an "Action Response."
17

Two examples of this phenomenon are organized labor and
civil rights groups pressing for equal educational and employ-
ment opportunities. Both began, not because of management
desires, but due to the organized efforts of special interest
groups. They started with minimal backing and limited support.
Their initial requests were ignored and dismissed as not war-
ranting management attention. As they grew in size, stature, and
political acumen they acquired strength, visibility and recog-
nition. When they were able to demonstrate sound leadership
and strong organization, their influence and power could no
longer be denied. Today that power is clearly evident in their
intimate relationships with local, state and federal officials
as well as private executives and corporate leaders.
The above examples describe the manner in which organiza-
tional mechanisms come into being, gain acceptance and stability.
They illustrate the process of evolution over time, from insig-
nificant beginnings to acknowledged centers of influence.
Their effectiveness is attested by the numerous changes in
policy throughout private industry and government. Many in-
centives have now been incorporated to ensure that their inter-
ests are maintained and protected. Few individuals have the
power to adversely modify the built-in procedures, guidance and
incentives instilled throughout the system.
B. GROUP DEVELOPMENT MODEL
The evolution of these mechanisms is depicted in the
Group Development Model (Fig. 2). The center structure is the
Chief Executive Action Model. The inward pointing arrows are
18

intrusion attempts by the special interest group and the out-
ward ones are responses by the chief executive.
The three peripheral balls represent a single group which
is going through a process of growth and development. The
evolution is a continuum, but for purposes of discussion it is
shown in three distinct phases. The Informal Phase (bottom
ball) is the birth of the group. Characteristically it is
small in the number of individuals involved and has minimal
professional stature. It is probably rather disorganized without
a single strong leader and tries to capitalize on unplanned op-
portunities to interface with the chief executive.
In phase two, the Minor Formal Phase, the group begins to
present itself as a defined body with established objectives.
It now has a title reflective of its constituency. While it is
better organized, it has difficulty maintaining cohesion. Major
activity occurs only when a crisis is pending. The remainder
of the time the membership performs assigned corporate functions
and group needs are seldom addressed. Within the corporate
organization it has achieved a modicum of recognition and can
obtain access to the chief executive upon request. Meetings
have to be scheduled well in advance and repeated cancellations
are accepted.
The top and largest ball is the final step, the Major Formal
Phase. The group has now reached maturity. It has achieved
recognition and is armed with political leverage and skill.
The leadership has established a reputation for its ability to














Figure 2: Group Development Model
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management and regularly scheduled meetings ensure that ob-
jectives are addressed systematically and routinely. The group
has become an organization with strong internal links and its
survival is no longer at issue. As long as there is a common
concern the group will continue to function. It now has easy
access to the chief executive. Meetings are scheduled at
short notice and executed promptly. There may even be an open
door policy for critical events.
C. PROGRESS MEASUREMENT
There are several indicators which identify the stage of
growth that a particular group has achieved. They pertain to
how and when the group approaches the chief executive, and
whether or not the group successfully overcomes the penetration
barrier.
The "how" component can be gaged by the nature of the re-
quest for executive support. In the beginning the group is
unsure of its position and the request is usually in the form
of a plea for help. During phase two the group has gained con-
fidence and usually is seeking recognition. By phase three
it has experienced numerous successes and its requests have
become demands No longer satisfied with having the oppor-
tunity to discuss its needs, it wants to see positive steps
taken toward meeting its demands. If they are not forthcoming,
then the group is in a position to apply pressure that causes the
chief executive to feel that it would be easier to comply.
Another measure of growth is the chief executive's avail-
ability to the group. As long as the group has to take
21

advantage of unplanned opportunities to establish contact it is
in the under-developed state (phase 1) . This is followed by
recognition (phase two) and the ability to request and schedule
meetings at the executive's convenience. It finally converts
into an open door relationship (phase three) . By this time the
group has demonstrated its political prowess and has estab-
lished a feeling of mutual respect. This will occur only when
the chief executive has come to anticipate or experience the
adverse consequences of being inattentive to group demands.
The last and most obvious measure is the group's faculty
to overcome the penetration barrier. Only when it has achieved
prominence within the organizational community will it be able
to cross the barrier and stimulate an action response. Penetra-
tion failures place the group somewhere in the earlier growth
stages. This measure, therefore, is only a means of evaluating
the achievement of the Major Formal Phase and does not locate the
group in a specific stage of earlier development.
D. INNOVATION GROUP MEMBERSHIP
If an innovation group is to be formed several questions
need attention. First: who would be interested in group in-
volvement?
The group should be comprised of individuals who have ex-
perienced the problems associated with an environment which is
non-receptive to innovation. Previous frustrations will provide
the motivation necessary to vigorously pursue innovation objec-
tives. Shared experiences will instill a common thread into
their personal goals and ideas. Membership should also include
22

anyone with an expressed or demonstrated interest in the
innovative process. Membership should not be limited to a
specialized group. It should include all skills and profes-
sions thereby establishing a strong and diversified base. The
total number of people involved is also an important factor.
Size is directly proportional to the future bargaining position
of the group. Hopefully, the group will contain people with pre-
vious leadership experience and existing organizational influ-
ence. The duration of the growth cycle will depend on the back-
grounds and abilities of the founding members. Credible indivi-
duals respected throughout the corporate structure can be a
tremendous asset during the early phases. People knowledgeable
in the political process can take advantage of timing and cri-
tical events to shorten the path to the major formal position.
E. PROTECTING THE GROUP DURING DEVELOPMENT
During the early growth phases the innovation group is sus-
ceptible to attack from non-supportive organizational elements.
Adversaries with minimal power will not be able to negate group
advances. If, however, the attacker is another group or indivi-
dual operating from a higher energy level, it could adversely
affect the growth process. Therefore it is necessary to pro-
vide protection during the earlier stages of development. The
amount of protection will depend on their adversaries' overall
strengths and the group's ability to counter aggressions. The
requirements for protection are more pronounced in the
beginning and diminish as the group matures.
23

Group protection is most effective when administered by a
high-ranking manager. Many early attacks will be eliminated
if the entire corporate organization is aware that a senior
manager will defend and actively support the innovation group.
In addition the protector's management skills will allow him
to accurately evaluate the opposition's strengths. This will
insure that management support is only supplied when needed.
The group must be allowed to struggle independently when the
probability for loss is minimized. Minor skirmishes provide
valuable opportunities to develop political skills.
The individual selected to sponsor the group should have
several attributes. Someone with a strong interest in innova-
tion would be a logical choice. The sponsor must be placed
high in the organization and respected throughout the corporate
structure. He must have communicative and political skills to
evaluate and handle confrontations. Since the implied threat
is usually more effective than direct action, sponsor involve-
ment should be minimized. Activity should be limited to the
amount necessary to warn detractors that support will be pro-
vided if it is needed. Any additional protection should occur
only if a major confrontation is imminent. Rotating the assign-
ment among several key individuals might provide additional
benefits. Not only is the protective umbrella strengthened, but
an early management awareness of the value of innovation can
result. A general concern for innovation at the higher manage-




F. INNOVATION GROUP OBJECTIVES
Innovation group objectives could span a wide range of
needs. Hopefully they will include the elimination of innovation
barriers and the establishment of organizational incentives.
Group activities must eventually focus on these two areas.
Major changes in the innovative environment will result when
the barriers are removed and positive incentives are established.
Because innovation barriers involve people they are very
sensitive to changes. One type of barrier is the individual who
is happy with the status quo and does not want to see it dis-
rupted. He views all change as bad and sees innovation as
creating chaos and imposing an unwarranted increase in work-
load. When this person is organizationally placed directly
above an innovator, creativity is stifled and often eliminated.
The group is, therefore, interested in removing the barrier
and providing freedom for the innovative process. It can man-
euver to either neutralize the individual or have him relocated.
A well-developed group may be able to achieve neutralization
by demonstrating its strength. If it can cause the manager to
feel that he lacks support and represents a minority position,
the manager will frequently stop his barrier tactics. If the
person is high in the management hierarchy, the group may lobby
for his relocation or removal. Pressure is applied to the chief
executive and other higK-rank in g managers who are supportive to
the innovative cause. United management support can be used
to isolate the individual from his peers. The pressure will
25

eventually cause the individual to revise his position or
experience adverse management actions.
Another type of barrier, and also a major concern of the
innovation group, is premature evaluation [Ref. 5]. It occurs
when an innovation is subjected to criticism or attack before
it has had a chance to yield any benefits. Appraisal normally
comes from peers and organizational competitors who may not
have a vested interest in the innovation. Their main thrust
is to diminish the innovator's professional standing. Fre-
quently they feel threatened by the results of the innovative
process. Premature evaluation can result in the innovation
not being carried to its maximum potential. It may lead to
the scrapping of an innovation which could have produced major
improvements. The innovation group can be effective by expos-
ing the attacks and soliciting management support for control
and elimination.
One way of minimizing this activity is to involve a maxi-
mum number of people in the innovation. Making innovation a
group effort can provide multiple benefits. When all of the
people who stand to gain from the innovation feel responsible
for its success there will be fewer individuals remaining as
potential critics. Responsibility will be more widely distri-
buted and the probability of success increased. Individuals
who would have been the most knowledgeable opponents of the
project will have been eliminated and any remaining adversaries




Positive organizational incentives play an important role
in the innovative environment. They are tied directly to the
reward system and are a reflection of management priorities.
The innovation group, like many other groups, is interested
in seeing that the reward system recognizes their cause. A
primary objective is to insure that innovation becomes not only
an excepted practice but an expected activity. This can only
occur when the reward system encourages innovation.
Organizational incentives usually go through an evolutionary
process. The first management concessions are visibility and
recognition via corporate news media and noncash rewards. They
enhance an individual's professional standing and bring his or
her achievements to the attention of other functions within
the organization. Cash rewards for cost savings and exceptional
performance are the next level of inducements. When innova-
tions can be tied to improvements the innovator receives a
percentage of the savings. The final phase is the establish-
ment of innovation as a criterion for performance appraisals
and promotional selection. This is the ultimate objective
for the innovation group. Innovation becomes the norm and
not the exception for position descriptions and annual evalu-
ations
.
G. EXECUTIVE AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES
When the innovation group reaches the Major Formal Phase
several changes can be expected. The Chief Executive, all
levels of management, and the entire organization will be
affected. The degree of impact will vary with the priority
and emphasis placed on innovation.
27

Changes to the Chief Executive can be analyzed by examin-
ing the Modified Chief Executive Action Model (Fig. 3). The
changes to the original model (Fig. 2) are a result of the
pressures applied by the organizational mechanism, the innova-
tion group. Once the innovation group penetrates the barrier,
the executive's attitude toward innovation begins to change,
unlike other intruders, the group's influence will broaden
his perspective and make him more receptive to other special
interests. This effect is shown as a reduction in the width
of the pentration barrier. Groups previously excluded from
entry are now capable of crossing the barrier. The energy
needed to obtain executive action has been reduced. In order
to accommodate these new interests, previously successful
_
in-
truders will be displaced. Redefined priorities will make
room for the new activities. Activities previously handled
by the chief executive will be delegated to lower level mana-
gers. Along with delegation goes the need for frequent chief
executive involvement. These changes provide the executive
with the time needed to actively pursue innovation.
Like the chief executive, the organization can expect
some significant changes. Reward system modifications will
be the most visible. Successful innovators will receive a
wide range of prizes, from verbal recognition to career ad-
vancements. More importantly, the changing reward system
signifies the beginning of a transition. Adjusted priorities
will now reflect a new emphasis on innovation. Along with























Figure 3 Modified Chief Executive Action Model
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innovators. Their advancement will bring a new mentality to
areas previously lacking concern for innovation. A passive
attitude of accepting innovation will not be enough. Organi-
zational requirements will mandate a continuing flow of inno-
vative activity. The new manager will expect the same actions
from peers and subordinates. Changing attitudes will eventually
result in an environment which is prepared to change when war-





There are numerous benefits to be achieved by encouraging
innovation. Improved organizational efficiency and effective-
ness are two of the by-products. They can occur when technology
is utilized in an area other than the one for which it was
originally designed.
Unfortunately, innovation is faced with many negative fac-
tors in the standard corporate environment. Incentives that
discourage innovation, barriers which impede its progress, and
reward systems which do not recognize its existence, are prime
examples. They discourage individuals from becoming involved
in innovative activity. In the above scenario the risks and
responsibilities of failure force innovation into dormancy.
Consequently, many opportunities for improvement are lost or
never recognized.
Changing the corporate environment requires management
action which will occur only when innovation can successfully
compete with other corporate needs. Management, like the rest
of the organization, has few positive incentives to stimulate
the needed changes. The average manager becomes enmeshed in
his daily activities and unconsciously blocks out innovation.
A proposed solution to the dilemma is to build an organi-
zational mechanism that will provide the stimulus necessary
to effect organizational changes. The mechanism does not make
the modifications directly, but creates the pressure needed
31

to get management attention and action. Resulting changes
should establish and emphasize positive incentives and suppress
or eliminate organizational barriers to the innovative process.
The mechanism is built around a special interest group.
The group's concern for innovation provides the foundation for
building a collective body. By protecting and nurturing the
nucleus it can eventually grow into a vehicle which will compete
for the organizational resources needed to develop an innova-
tive environment.
The group's success will be reflected first in a modified
reward system. Various compensations will be established for
successful innovators. As the rewards increase the environment
will begin to improve markedly. Eventually vacant management
positions will be filled by innovators. Their advancement
signifies a change in how the organization views innovation.
Innovation will now become a requirement rather than a tolerated
practice
.
The prescribed mechanism is only one approach. Similar
mechanisms can be designed to achieve desired objectives.
Careful evaluation of a specific organization may reveal a
more effective means. The objective is to build a mechanism
which can survive and compete in the organizational environ-
ment. This implies that it must become institutionalized and
therefore should include three important elements:
1. Pressure comes from the bottom, therefore the
mechanism must include individuals from lower
levels in the organization.
2. The mechanism must have sufficient energy to compete
:un
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with existing and future organizational needs

3. The mechanism must be designed for longevity. It
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